ABSTRACT In this paper I examine some of the issues surrounding the moral status of the therapy known as ‘deprogramming’. I argue against the extreme view that all deprogrammings are morally impermissible. In certain instances deprogramming is morally justified because it is quite capable of restoring the conditions needed for the exercise of autonomy. The view of autonomy I am following is that constructed by Gerald Dworkin, wherein two conditions must be met in describing a person as autonomous—authenticity and procedural (...) independence. Autonomy of another type, described by Dworkin as authenticity plus substantive independence, may be lost by persons involved in cults but in those instances deprogramming as reconstructed in this paper is not a morally justified measure. (shrink)

Today, societal decisions in areas of complexity are often dominated by one of three alternative ways: (a) by scientists, nowadays often in combination with commercial interest; (b) by politicians alone; and (c) by simply “laissez-faire,” or “the tyranny of small steps.” None of these three ways of decision making is fully democratic because they do not create enough awareness among the politicians and the general public. One reason is that the decision making basis becomes too narrowly framed and fragmented. Biotechnology (...) will continue to feed society with new democratic challenges for many years, perhaps decades, to come. The initially promising ideas of participative and deliberative democracy do not seem to solve the awareness problem. Instead, the authors propose an approach with more structured efforts for awareness building with transparency and participation taking place within the framework of representative democracy. (shrink)